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ABSTRACT
The National Training Center (NTC) located at Fort Irwin, California performs the
critical Army mission of preparing battalion task forces and brigade staffs for combat. The
NTC provides a unique opportunity to assess training proficiency. To assist in the training
assessment of rotating units, the Army has spent millions of dollars on a state of the art
instrumentation system that transmits objective data from all player vehicles and stores the
information in a database. Currently, no subjective observer-controller (O/C) observations
of training are stored in the database. The primary emphasis of this research is to develop
a training assessment system and model subjective data encapsulation to enhance training
performance analysis. The assessment system is designed to be incorporated into a
relational database that will allow analysis of various measures of performance that
provide input for platoon through brigade level After Action Reviews (AAR).
Additionally, the database will support methods for simple data manipulation for the
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The National Training Center (NTC) located at Fort Irwin, California performs
one of the most important missions in the United States Army - that of preparing battalion
task forces and brigade staffs for combat. The NTC provides a unique opportunity to
assess training proficiency. Its large maneuver training areas and world class opposing
force (OPFOR) allow for full scale battalion force-on-force operations. During the past
1 6 years, the Army has added a computer-driven, live-fire complex with sophisticated
targetry and a state of the art instrumentation system.
The current instrumentation system stores data transmitted by player vehicles in an
antiquated Ingres database. These data, along with subjective observations of the
observer-controllers (O/Cs), provide the input for platoon through brigade level After
Action Reviews (AARs) that focus on cause and effect. Currently, no subjective O/C
observations are stored in the database. The few tasks evaluated by O/Cs are scored on a
"yes", "no", or "nts" (not to standard) scale.
The NTC requires the identification of tasks that should be evaluated to provide
meaningful feedback to the rotating unit (BLUEFOR). This research proposes a selected
group of tasks based upon the seven Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS), current
Mission Training Plans (MTPs), and the Critical Combat Functions (CCFs). Additionally,
selected data that are currently collected by O/Cs are also included.
The performance measurement system proposed in this research is a five-point-
graphic rating scale using behaviorally anchored words. Additional evaluation categories
are included to account for potential holes in the data which could affect the validity of the
data. The implementation of the system will be in the form of O/C evaluation cards that
are organized by unit echelon and BOS. Each O/C will be required to carry and fill out
only one card and the cards are independent of the type of mission.
IX
This research proposes the use of semantic objects to encapsulate the subjective
O/C observations and allow them to be stored in the relational database being
implemented at the NTC. An example graphical user interface (GUI) is provided that will
enable Tactical Analysis and Feedback (TAP) analysts to interact with the database to
input data as well as make queries to the database to generate AAR reports. The AAR
reports display numerous measures of performance (MOP) for each BOS. The MOPs are
designed to serve as a tool for the O/Cs to initiate relevant discussion during AARs.
The MOPs and data collected on the O/C evaluation cards will support post-
rotation analyses. The post-rotation analysis can focus on identifying the training
deficiencies within one unit or analysts can use basic statistical techniques to identify the
systematic shortcomings of all units across all rotations.
The greatest strength of all these methodologies is that they are simple. They
involve the examination of training by BOS and by unit echelon, techniques already in use
at the NTC. Graphical user interfaces are recommended to enable every analyst to have
the ability to input data into the database as well as query the database for information to
produce specific reports. Additionally, when mathematics are introduced, only simple,




The National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California performs one of the
most important training missions in the United States Army - that of preparing battalion
task forces and brigade staffs for combat. During the past 16 years, the Army has added a
computer-driven, live-fire complex with sophisticated targetry; a full-time opposing force
(OPFOR) that is trained and equipped with Soviet-style equipment and can replicate a
range of possible regional threats; a state of the art instrumentation system that monitors
the battle; and 800 full-time combat trainers who observe and control units during training
at Fort Irwin.
The Range Data Management System (RDMS) is a state of the art instrumentation
system that transmits objective data from all player vehicles in a rotating unit (BLUEFOR)
to the Core Instrumentation System (CIS) where the data are stored in a database. These
data, along with the subjective observations of the observer-controllers (O/Cs), provide
input for platoon through brigade level After Action Reviews (AARs) that focus on cause
and effect. For each engagement, soldiers and leaders assess what happened, why it
happened, and determine how to improve their battlefield skills.
B. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
The CIS stores data transmitted by the RDMS in an antiquated Ingres database
which has been both extensively and exclusively modified by the NTC for use by Tactical
Analysis and Feedback (TAF) center analysts. Currently, no subjective O/C observations
are stored in the database. O/C observations are displayed on Harvard Graphics slides
during AARs. When a subjective observation requires an evaluation of performance, O/Cs
use a "yes", "no", or "nts" (not to standard) categorical rating scale. Rotating units are
not given the specific observations that led to the O/C evaluation on a particular area of
performance and usually gain little constructive information from the assessment.
O/C observations are also written in narrative form for inclusion in the Take-Home
Package (THP) that is produced for each rotating unit. Upon the conclusion of a rotation
at the NTC, two sets of THPs are prepared. Each TAF produces a THP that is given to
the BLUEFOR unit for use at home station. Generally, this unit THP consists of copies of
all the slides shown at the AARs and a video tape copy of all AARs. No standard exists
for these THPs and they vary greatly between the TAFs. Civilian contractors, with input
from the TAFs, produce another THP consisting of the executive summaries of the
various battles. This THP is sent to the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) at Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas for archival purposes and post-rotation analysis. In general, the unit
THPs are not used to a wide extent at home station, nor is the executive summary version
useful to analysts at the Center for Army Lessons Learned.
C. SCOPE OF THESIS
The NTC is implementing a new relational database application in Oracle that will
efficiently store both RDMS and O/C data. Concurrent efforts in a Naval Postgraduate
School thesis titled Modeling Data Encapsulation and a Communication Networkfor the
National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA address the design of the new database for
objective data elements [Ref. 1]. The primary purpose of this research is to identify the
aspects of unit performance that can be evaluated subjectively by O/Cs at the NTC for use
during AARs and inclusion into unit THPs. A methodology for making quantitative
assessments of unit performance will assist in the determination of cause and effect and
will benefit the Center for Army Lessons Learned for post rotation analysis.
D. THESIS STRUCTURE
The next chapter of this thesis gives a brief overview of NTC operations and
explains the integration of the RDMS currently being used. Chapter III details subjective
O/C data requirements and proposes a methodology for evaluating subjective
observations. Chapter IV offers methodologies for developing quantifiable measures of
performance and the incorporation of O/C data into a relational database. This chapter
also outlines how the O/C evaluations relate to post-rotation analysis and the development





Twelve times a year, Army units from all over the United States travel to Fort
Irwin, located in the Mojave Desert, for National Training Center (NTC) rotations. A
typical rotation lasts twenty-four days and involves several days of equipment issue,
followed by fourteen days of intensive force-on-force and live-fire training. The units then
spend time cleaning up, turning in equipment, and returning to their home stations.
Each rotation brings 3500 to 5000 soldiers who represent major combat, combat
support and combat service support elements of an Army brigade. The troops arrive by
air at various locations in California and Nevada and are transported by bus to Fort Irwin.
They transport unit vehicles and equipment by rail to the Yermo Railhead located along
Interstate 15, north of Barstow, California. Upon arrival, the soldiers prepare their
equipment and draw additional material from the extensive array of pre-positioned
hardware that is maintained at Fort Irwin.
B. INSTRUMENTATION
The purpose of the training at the NTC is to identify areas in which rotating
battalion task forces and brigade staffs must improve. The goal of the
Observer/Controllers (O/C) is to assist the BLUEFOR unit in that purpose by providing
subjective observations on all training conducted. To assist with the collection of
objective observations, the Army has spent millions of dollars in instrumenting the NTC in
order to provide the best possible feedback. Vehicles and personnel at the NTC are
equipped with the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System II (MILES II) which is
an eye-safe laser system that simulates combat engagements. MILES II, an upgrade of
MILES I, adds new features that allow for additional information gathering. Like MILES
I, MILES II allows one combat system to "kill" another system through the emission of a
laser beam. The detector belts on a vehicle being fired upon measure the strength of an
incoming beam and if it is located within the maximum effective range of the firing vehicle,
a "hit" is registered. The MILES II system then runs through a stochastic simulation to
determine the outcome of the engagement with the assistance of pre-determined
probabilities of kill. One of six outcomes is possible: near-miss, hit, catastrophic kill,
communications kill, mobility kill, or a firepower kill. MILES I simply returned a near
miss or a kill. Under the old system, when a vehicle was killed, the OC would assess the
type of kill and would dictate whether or not the vehicle could continue in the battle.
In addition to the MILES II, the NTC mounts several other instrumentation
devices on the vehicles. The Global Position Satellite (GPS) receiver records the location
of the vehicle on the battlefield. The Simulated Area Weapons Effects (SAWE) receiver
simulates the effects of indirect fire and chemical munitions strikes. The Mines Effects
Simulator (MES) receiver simulates the effects of damage sustained due to minefields.
Three additional instrumentation systems measure the hull to turret angle, the type of
ammunition selected for an engagement, and the number of rounds of ammunition by type
currently on board each vehicle.
All of these systems feed information into a "brain box" located on each vehicle
called the Data Communications Interface (DCI). The DCI transmits data over the
recently upgraded Range Data Management System (RDMS), which consists of the DCI,
a Radio Relay Subsystem (RSS) and the central node. The DCI transmits data upon the
occurrence of an event. Events include the vehicle firing, the vehicle moving more than
100 meters, or the vehicle being engaged by an enemy vehicle. Additionally, if more than
ten seconds has elapsed since the DCI last transmitted data, it sends an update to the
central node. The central node is a hardware and software subsystem that links the RSS
to the Core Instrumentation System (CIS). The CIS takes the information received from
the central node to create a computerized picture of the battlefield that displays vehicles
moving, vehicles firing, and vehicles being engaged by other vehicles. This animated war
is superimposed on a computerized terrain map of the NTC that includes the operational
graphics of the BLUEFOR unit and manual inputs that allow minefields, chemical strikes,
and artillery fire missions to be displayed almost as soon as they occur during the battle.
The CIS stores the raw data received from the central node into an Ingres database for the
purpose of reports generation and the archiving of information for further analysis.

III. TRAINING ASSESSMENT
A. NEED FOR TRAINING ASSESSMENT
«
Training performance feedback is essential in maximizing the benefit of any
training endeavor. Systematic measurement and subjective observations by subject matter
experts (SMEs) are required to accomplish this mission. Accurate measurement of
combat effectiveness has been recognized by the Army as critical to three objectives: (1)
determining the combat readiness of units; (2) assessing the training status of units and
identifying subsequent training requirements; and (3) identifying improvements to
doctrine, training, organization, material, and leadership [Ref. 2].
The National Training Center (NTC) provides a unique opportunity to assess
training proficiency. Its large maneuver training areas and world class opposing force
(OPFOR) allow for full scale battalion force-on-force operations. For many battalions, an
NTC rotation is the only opportunity during a calendar year to train as a combined arms
team with all its attachments against a skilled, free-thinking opponent.
The NTC has over 800 full-time Observer/Controllers (O/Cs) and has an
instrumented data collection system that allows for the real time gathering of objective
information. O/Cs provide subjective observations during the AARs and provide
subjective comments for inclusion in the Take-Home Packages, but they conduct very
little quantitative assessment.
B. CONCEPTUAL METHODS
The Army Research Institute (ARI) has conducted significant research focusing on
how to capture data at the NTC and convert it into a useful format that training analysts
can use for study and analysis. The principal model used to direct the ARI research
























Figure 1 . Training Assessment Model.
The majority of the research effort focuses on methods using the various Army
Mission Training Plans (MTPs) as the core documents in developing a measurement
strategy. The MTPs in their current form are considered by many to be impractical to use
for assessing collective performance, particularly in advanced training environments like
the NTC, so modifications are necessary [Ref. 3].
Subject matter experts (SMEs) from the Infantry School, Armor School, NTC, and
the Combined Arms Center identified tasks at platoon, company, and battalion levels that
are considered to be critical in the accomplishment of the four principal missions at the
NTC: movement to contact, hasty attack, deliberate attack, and defend. Tables l,2,and 3
display the number of critical tasks identified by element size and Battlefield Operating
System (BOS), the major functions performed by Army forces to execute Army
operations.
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INT MAN FS ADA M/CM/S CSS BC Total
Planning 12 21 7 7 9 5 23 84
Preparation 9 9 6 7 7 10 13 61
Execution 7 19 5 2 7 6 8 54
Total 28 49 18 16 23 21 44 199
Table 1. Battalion Critical Tasks.
INT MAN FS ADA M/CM/S CSS BC Total
Planning 11 26 10 2 6 6 25 86
Preparation 5 8 9 2 5 6 10 45
Execution 4 19 2 2 5 6 11 46
Total 20 53 21 6 16 18 46 177
Table 2. Company Critical Tasks.
INT MAN FS £\MJr£\ M/CM/S CSS BC Total
Planning 6 21 5 2 5 2 21 61
Preparation 3 11 3 1 6 3 10 37
Execution 2 21 2 2 6 4 10 47
Total 11 53 10 5 17 9 41 145
Table 3. Platoon Critical Tasks.
The SME panel significantly reduced the number of tasks listed in the MTPs, but
the lists are still extensive. For a platoon conducting a hasty attack, an O/C would have to
evaluate the tasks listed in Figure 2.
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HASTY ATTACK - MISSION TASKS
2 Conduct Terrain Analysis 43 Control Fires
3 Identify Enemy Strengths and Weaknesses 44 Maintain Lateral Contact with Adjacent Units
4 Plan for Mutual Support 56 Plan Evacuation Procedures
5 Plan Movement 68 Rehearse Reactions to Enemy Air
6 Plan Actions on Contact 79 React to Enemy Air
9 Plan Reorganization 92 Control Movement
11 Plan Air Defense Measures 93 Coordinate Plans with Lateral Units
13 Plan for NBC Operations 94 Maintain Communications
14 Understand Commander's Intent 95 Designate a Support by Fire Element
15 Understand Control Measures 96 Designate Consolidation Procedures
18 Plan Redundant Communications 97 Verify Supporting Fires
19 Plan Fire Control and Distribution Measures 98 Establish Lateral Contact with Adjacent Units
21 Conduct Battlefield Update 99 Supervise the Implementation of Plans and Orders
23 Disseminate Fire Support Plan 100 Designate Battle Drills and Procedures
25 Conduct P re-Combat Checks 101 Establish Fire Support Communications
26 Prepare for NBC Operations 102 Prepare for Breaching Operations
27 Establish Redundant Communications 103 Move to Assault Position
30 React to Unexpected Enemy Contact 107 Maintain Operations Security
31 React to Change in Situation 111 Mark Breach
32 Conduct Fire and Movement 114 Disseminate Intelligence and Combat Information
33 Conduct Assault 115 Report Combat Information
34 Acquire and Engage Targets 116 Update Estimate of the Situation
35 Conduct Consolidation 123 Report On-Hand Status
36 Execute Fire Support Plan 126 Issue Warning Order
37 Support Breaching Effort 127 Conduct Mission Analysis
38 Conduct Breach of Obstacle 128 Initiate Planning Process
39 Reorganize Assets 129 Conduct Briefbacks
40 Conduct Evacuation Procedures 130 Refine Plan
41 Respond to NBC Operations 131 Issue FRAGO
42 Maintain Communications 132 Comply with Commander's Intent
Figure 2. Platoon Hasty Attack Critical Tasks.
To add to the complexity of this system, numerous schematic wiring diagrams
were developed to identify which tasks should be evaluated by mission. The wiring
diagrams further divided the three phases of a battle typically discussed at NTC (planning,
preparation, and execution) into even smaller phases. Figure 3 shows the wiring diagram
for the execution phase of a platoon hasty attack. The task numbers listed in the diagram
are the tasks shown in Figure 2 [Ref. 3].
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Figure 3. Execution Phase- Platoon Hasty Attack.
C. SHORTFALLS
1. Measurement
The NTC has accomplished its goal of providing realistic combat training, but
some feel that the data available are not adequately being used to identify general training
weaknesses throughout the Army [Ref. 4]. To measure combat effectiveness, O/Cs have
to measure a unit's performance within the framework of established doctrine.
Unfortunately, the translation of doctrine into identifiable, measurable performance
standards is an extremely difficult task. Unit training manuals avoid precise specification
of performance standards for maneuver units and concentrate instead on task performance
procedures. The omission of standards for successful performance is understandable as
training exercises are conducted on various types of terrain, during radically different
weather conditions, and during both daylight and periods of limited visibility. Exercises
also feature opposing forces of different sizes, skill level, equipment, and motivation [Ref.
5]. Additionally, when examining collective unit performance, it is often difficult for the
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observer to know which is collective performance and which is the result of aggregate
individual performances [Ref. 6]. All of these factors contribute to the training
measurement problem being faced by our modern army.
O/Cs can generally categorize a unit as effective or ineffective, but they usually are
not able to substantiate their opinions with any form of precise data. This drawback is
analogous to the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, a measurement problem in physics. Its
three premises are that the process of measurement dynamically affects the object being
measured, that the object has varying states of existence, and that the object is known only
through measurement.
In the case of the first premise, special training conducted in preparation for an
NTC rotation and actions taken because a unit knows it is being observed by O/Cs often
result in performance that is inconsistent with typical unit performance. Personnel
turbulence and turnover, as well as casualties sustained during simulated combat are
factors that correspond to the second premise. Units are not fixed entities, but change in
composition over time. Finally, because accurate measurement of combat effectiveness is
difficult to obtain at home station, measurements taken at a training facility like the NTC
often provide the best indicators of unit's effectiveness. However, these indicators only
hold when the measurement was made [Ref. 5].
2. Subjective Data
The NTC collects enormous amounts of objective data over the RDMS, but uses
very little of the data in its current form because the database is incapable of providing
quality training feedback to the O/Cs for use in unit AARs. These objective data, though
used infrequently, are considered by some to be valuable in that they are not subject to
O/C bias or interpretation. Others believe that subjective measures are often superior
because many facets of performance can be integrated into an overall judgment [Ref. 6].
O/Cs use very little subjective data during the AARs. Subjective observations are
generally geared toward preparation for combat tasks, such as rehearsals, operations
orders and pre-combat inspections, and O/Cs assess units on a "yes", "no", or "not to
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standard" scale. Failure to use more extensive subjective observations eliminates
performance measurement for some key areas such as decision making and cognitive skills
[Ref. 6]. The only record of any observations in these areas is in the form of narrative
comments that are included in unit THPs and analysts are forced to sift through
voluminous pages to find them.
3. Reliability
Measurement reliability is an important, yet commonly overlooked dimension of
performance measurement. Without adequate reliability, measurement is useless. Two
kinds of reliability, inter-observer reliability and stability, are critical to quality training
measurement. Inter-observer reliability is the extent to which two or more observers
produce similar results in measurement and stability is the extent to which measures taken
at one time are representative of measures taken at other times [Ref. 6]. The O/Cs play a
key role in establishing measurement reliability.
All measurements that involve human beings making assessments are subject to the
biases of the evaluator. Because rating performance is a complex task, raters have the
opportunity to make errors. Subjective evaluations of training performance can often be
biased by impressions of effort, rather than being pure measures of achievement [Ref. 6].
Other potential subjective evaluation problems identified are in Table 4 [Ref. 7].
Error Effects
Leniency Ratings tend to be displaced toward favorable end of scale.
Sequential Effects Judgment of an item on the rating scale is affected by
the items which precede it.
Distribution Error Ratings tend to pile up in the middle of the response
distribution.
Intercorrelational Error
The halo effect in which the rating on one characteristic spills
over to affect ratings on other characteristics which
are distinctly different.
Table 4. Rating Errors.
Training the O/Cs in the measurement system and making them aware of the
potential pitfalls can help alleviate these problems.
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4. NTC Organizational Culture
Many of the problems with training evaluation at the NTC stem from the deep-
rooted organizational culture that permeates the NTC. There is tremendous
organizational resistance amongst the O/Cs to any measurement system that attempts to
evaluate a unit or involves any form of doctrinal checklist recording form. The O/Cs at
the NTC claim they do not compare units and that the NTC is a training center not a
testing center. The belief that a unit cannot be trained properly if attempts are made to
evaluate its performance has led to years of poor data collection and analysis. The result
has been a general failure to identify the root causes behind numerous training deficiencies
and has led Army units to deploy to the NTC and continually make the same mistakes.
The O/Cs at the NTC are among the finest officers and non-commissioned officers
in the Army. They have all served, commanded and excelled in the types of units they
evaluate and are the tactical and doctrinal subject matter experts (SMEs) in their
respective areas. The feeling amongst O/Cs is that the AAR is the premier feedback
mechanism for units during their rotation and most military professionals agree. The AAR
will last for two hours at company and battalion levels and one hour at platoon level.
Typically, that only allows enough time for the O/Cs to highlight the most significant
training shortcomings and often focuses only on areas of performance that the unit can
attempt to improve upon for the next battle in the rotation. Many pertinent O/C
observations are never discussed due to the limited duration of the AAR and are only
recorded if the O/C remembers to include the observations in the THP.
5. Practicality
There are numerous problems with past attempts to measure training performance
at the NTC. Many of the proposed methods are simply too lengthy and too complicated.
They involve endless checklists with missions broken down into tasks and subtasks, each
with numerous standards. It is often unclear which portions of which checklists should be
filled out. There is also a problem when a task included in the checklist is not performed
by the unit or is performed out of sight of the O/C. If the O/C fails to note that the task
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was not observed and leaves that portion of the checklist blank, there is now an
unexplainable hole in the data which directly affects the data's validity.
The current checklist systems typically call for the data recording forms to be filled
out only one time, usually upon completion of a particular phase in the battle. This forces
the O/C to make one subjective evaluation of a task even though the task may have been
performed numerous times, or continually over time. This type of evaluation system does
not allow O/Cs or analysts to make time period specific queries to the database in order to
determine what areas of performance significantly influenced various portions of the battle
or how performance on a group of tasks may have been related.
D. METHODOLOGY FOR MEASUREMENT SYSTEM
1. General
The NTC requires a system for training performance measurement that: 1) records
pertinent subjective evaluations by O/Cs, 2) can be rapidly placed in a database, 3)
provides useful input into AARs and THPs, 4) assists analysts in post-rotation analysis,
and 5) is easily executable by O/Cs. Although all of the above requirements are important,
ease of execution by O/Cs is paramount.
The job of an O/C at the NTC is extremely demanding. Units that rotate through
the NTC fight simulated battles in Ml Abrams Tanks and M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles
(BFVs). Rotations will sometimes include the addition of a light infantry battalion. As
units maneuver across the NTC in their tracked combat vehicles, O/Cs follow along in
tactical wheeled vehicles. In the case of light infantry battalions, O/Cs walk with the unit
they are observing. Any performance measurement system to be implemented at the NTC
must not interfere with the O/Cs principal duties of observing and controlling and from a
safety standpoint, must not impede the O/Cs ability to maintain his situational awareness.
During simulated battles, obscurants such as blowing sand and smoke make maneuvering
along side 70-ton combat vehicles extremely hazardous.
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2. System of Systems Methodology
Critics claim that the Mission Training Plans (MTPs) are too detailed to serve as
an appropriate measurement system and that the Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS) are
oriented at higher level units. However, both of these tools are valuable because they
document training in terms of our current doctrine.
The foundation of the system of systems methodology is the seven BOSs:
Intelligence, Maneuver, Fire Support, Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability, Air
Defense, Combat Service Support, and Battle Command. The methodology is based upon
the premise that maneuver ground warfare is a system consisting of seven subsystems, the
BOSs, all of which must be integrated and function in a satisfactory manner for the larger
system to function properly. The same premise holds true for all BOSs. Each BOS has
subsytems that must function properly in order for the BOS to have its full impact on the
battle being waged. The Critical Combat Functions (CCF), outlined in TRADOC PAM
11-9, are used to bridge the gap between the BOSs and MTPs and provide a useful
method to categorize performance at the battalion level. At levels below battalion,
selected tasks from the MTPs as well as data that are historically collected by O/Cs are
grouped by BOS and serve as the primary evaluative tools.
For example, maintenance is one subsystem of the BOS Combat Service Support.
Often times, a battalion's Operational Readiness (OR) rate is used as the sole measure of
effectiveness (MOE) to describe a unit's maintenance posture. This is a simplistic
approach which does nothing to analyze the root causes of any maintenance problems.
The methodology proposed in this research breaks these BOS subsytems down by unit
size, the concept being that the maintenance procedures followed at platoon and company
levels can have enormous impact on the battalion's overall maintenance posture. Figure 4
illustrates the methodology.





Vlaintenance Team Verifies PMCS, orders necessary parts






Diagnosis, substitution, exchange, repair, and return of equipment
Status Reporting
Figure 4. System of Systems Approach.
Certain tasks, such as status reporting in the case of maintenance, are common to
units at every level. Other tasks take place only at one level, yet can impact the overall
system. A low OR rate may be a function of parts not being put on order when needed at
the company level as opposed to operators not performing preventive maintenance checks
and services (PMCS) on their assigned equipment or a poorly performing battalion
maintenance section. Therefore, if a measure of effectiveness, such as a unit's OR rate,
indicates a maintenance shortcoming in the unit, the database can be queried to show O/C
evaluations of all related tasks throughout the battalion. These queries will provide




Critical to the functionality of an O/C's observations is the measurement system
used to describe the rotating unit's performance. Standard Army training protocols use
simple evaluation systems. Tasks listed in MTPs are evaluated on a "trained", "needs
practice", or "untrained" scale while the subtasks are evaluated on a "go" or "no go" basis
[Ref. 8]. These two measurement systems are not specific and do not provide the O/C
with enough choices to properly discriminate a unit's performance. The differences
between a "needs practice" evaluation and an "untrained" evaluation are not adequately
delineated because neither standard is clearly defined.
Fort Polk, Louisiana's Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), a training center
similar to NTC developed for light infantry units, uses the tasks and subtasks listed in the
MTPs as its performance measurement system. O/Cs at JRTC are given "greenbooks"
that contain only the MTP tasks pertinent to the given mission. All tasks are evaluated on
a five-point ordinal scale using behaviorally anchored words [Ref. 9]. This is similar to the
approach used during a RAND study of the effects of direct fire planning conducted at the
NTC in 1994. Figure 5 shows the similarities of these two systems.
The system proposed in this research is a similar type of measurement system with
minor modifications. O/Cs will evaluate tasks on a five-point graphic rating scale using
behaviorally anchored words. Each numerical rating will have an evaluative measure and
a standard associated with it. This is a modification of standard graphic rating scales
which typically do not use associated standards [Ref. 7]. In addition, other evaluation
categories are included to account for any potential holes in the data so that the validity of
the data is not called into question during analysis. The proposed evaluation system is




1 Poor Unit completely lacked technical and tactical
proficiency to perform this task to standard.
2 Weak Unit attempted to perform task but lacked technical
and tactical proficiency to meet all standards.
3 Adequate Unit demonstrated technical and tactical proficiency
to perform this task to standard.
4 Good Unit demonstrated technical and tactical proficiency
to perfom task and exceeded some standards.
5 Excellent Unit demonstrated technical and tactical proficiency









Figure 5. Current Measurement Systems.
Rating Description Standards
None Unit failed to execute a task that was demanded
by the tactical situation.
i Poor Unit completely lacked technical and tactical
proficiency to perform this task to standard.
2 Weak Unit attempted to perform task but lacked technical
and tactical proficiency to meet all standards.
3 Adequate Unit demonstrated technical and tactical proficiency
to perform task to standard
4 Good Unit demonstrated technical and tactical proficiency
to perform task and exceeded some standards.
5 Excellent Unit demonstrated technical and tactical proficiency
to perform task and exceed most standards.
N/A Not Applicable The tactical situation did not demand the unit to
perform this task.
N/O Not Observed The tactical situation made it impractical for the O/C
to observe this task.
Table 5. Proposed Evaluation System.
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The evaluation system in scale form is shown in Figure 6. When the scale is based
on the numbers 1 through 5(1-7, 1-9 etc.), it is commonly referred to as a Likert-type
scale and the intervals represent supposedly equal orders of magnitude of some measure.
Research has shown that there is little utility in having more than five scale categories
[Ref. 7].











Figure 6. Graphic Rating Scale.
This type of scaling instrument provides analysts with ordinal data. Table 6 shows











































Table 6. Scales of Measurement.
The rating scale described in this research was designed under the assumption that
the "distance", or the difference in level of training, between any two numbers on the
rating scale are equal. This is not an unusual assumption as many scaling instruments
assume that the rater is capable of rating or sorting on an equal interval scale [Ref. 11].
Experimental data often approach the condition of equal intervals well enough that there is
tolerable error in applying the statistics applicable to interval data. Guilford agrees that
these approximations are allowable in order to extract the most information from the data,
but cautions that "intolerable approximations" should not be accepted [Ref. 12].
Additionally, once sufficient rotation data are available, methods described in the Law of
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Categorical Judgment can be used to test the validity of the assumption. These methods
are derived by assuming that the frequencies with which discriminal processes are
associated with any given stimulus form a normal distribution [Ref. 11].
4. Implementation
The implementation of the methodology will be in the form of performance
evaluation cards. The system is designed so that an O/C will only have to carry and fill
out one card, regardless of the type of mission. It makes no difference whether it is an
offensive or defensive operation, or whether it is conducted during force-on-force or live-
fire operations. The cards to be carried by the platoon and company O/Cs are shown in
Figure 7 and Figure 8, respectively. The battalion level BOS cards are in Appendix A.
23
Mission DATK MTC DEF LF FOF
TF CO PLT TD
Intel Observation
1 Dissemination of intel to subordinates 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
2 Reports all enemy activity to higher 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
Maneuver
3 Battle drills execution, mounted 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
4 Battle drills execution, dismounted 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
5 Movement formations 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
6 Movement techniques 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
7 Fratricide prevention 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
Battle Command
8 Platoon SOP execution 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
9 Net discipline 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
10 Fire control SOP's 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
11 Control of dismounts 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
M/CM/S
12 M-8 emplaced 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
13 # dismounted fighting positions to std
14 # vehicle fighting positions to std
15 Hasty protective minefields
/
/
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
16 Manual breaching techniques 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
17 Vehicle breaching techniques 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
Fire Support
18 Target list disseminated 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
19 Priority of fires understood 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
20 Call for fire 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
21 Location of FIST and mortars 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
22 FS net freqs and callsigns 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
Air Defense
23 Air guard SOP 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
24 AWS/WCS understood 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
CSS
25 Status reporting 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
26 PMCS 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
27 Buddy aid/combat lifesaver 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
Prep for Combat
28 Boresight 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
29 C/PCI 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
30 Class lll/V upload 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
31 Rehearsals 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
32 Safety/risk assessment 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
33 Warning Order 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
34 Operations Order 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
35 Task of Interest 1 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
36 Task of Interest 2 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
37 Task of Interest 3 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
38 Freeform 1
39 Freeform 2
Fiaure 7. Platoon O/C Evaluation Card.
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Mission DATK MTC DEF LF FOF
TF CO TD
Intel Observation
40 Performs Co Level IPB 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
41 Disseminates intel to subordinates 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
42 Assesses local enemy situation and reports 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
43 Company R & S planning 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
Maneuver
44 Engagement area preparation 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
45 Direct fire planning 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
46 Actions on contact 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
47 Movement formations 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
48 Fire Control and distribution 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
59 React to indirect fire 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
50 Fratricide prevention 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
51 Consolidate and Reorganize 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
52 # dismounts engaged in fight/total dismounts /
Battle Command
53 Co SOP Execution 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
54 Commander's estimate process 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
55 Mission analysis 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
56 Decides on need for action or change 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
57 Co Net discipline and crosstalk 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
M/CM/S
58 Breach Obstacles 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
59 Emplacement of mines and complex obstacles 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
60 Physical security measures 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
61 Hasty Deocn 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
62 Unmasking procedures 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
Fire Support
63 Positioning of FIST 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
64 Co fire plan and target list 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
65 Designation of priorities of fire 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
66 Call for Fire 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
Air Defense
67 Employment of organic weapons aganst enemy air 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
68 Early Warning 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
69 Cover and concealment 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
CSS
70 Status reporting 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
71 Necessary classes of supply on-hand 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
72 Maint Tm verifies PMCS and orders parts 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
73 Assesses NMC vehicles, fixes forward, or evacs 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
74 Recovery operations 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
75 CASEVAC plan 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
76 # DOW/ Casualties /
Prep for Combat
77 Backbriefs 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
78 Rehearsals 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
79 Safety/risk assessment 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
80 Warning Order 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
81 Operations Order 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
82 Task of Interest 1 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
83 Task of Interest 2 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
84 Task of Interest 3 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
85 Freeform 1
86 Freeform 2
Figure 8. Company O/C Evaluation Card.
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All evaluation cards will contain three tasks of interest to be evaluated during a
rotation. The tasks of interest will be designated by the appropriate level of leadership at
the NTC and should remain constant through the course of a rotation. The purpose of
these tasks is to give the O/Cs the ability to track the performance of units on tasks that
are not listed on the cards, but that the O/Cs believe are important. The NTC maintains a
list of tasks and combat functions which units typically do not perform in a satisfactory
manner. These tasks of interest could be used to divide a poorly performed task down
into its most basic components at each level of command in an attempt to isolate the root
cause of the poor performance.
The cards also contain two freeform comment blocks. The freeform comments
should be brief, no more than two or three sentences, and should be filled out at the
conclusion of a battle. The purpose of the comment blocks is to provide the O/C with the
opportunity to identify two aspects of unit performance, either in a positive or negative
manner, that had a direct impact on the particular unit or staff section's performance.
A significant weakness of current systems is that these systems only record one
evaluation of task performance on tasks that are executed repeatedly or continually. The
evaluation system proposed in this research overcomes this by taking into account the time
that an observation is made and allows the O/C to change his evaluation over time. The
O/C can change his evaluation any time he notices a change in performance and should
reaffirm certain evaluations at critical points in a battle, such as a unit coming under fire
from enemy vehicles, a unit hitting an obstacle, or a unit encountering a chemically
contaminated area. By associating a time with each observation, queries can be made to
the database by unit and period of time which will assist both O/Cs and analysts in finding
the root causes of training deficiencies.
The recording of multiple O/C observations of one task over time will require the
assistance of analysts in the Tactical Analyst and Feedback (TAP) facility. Every O/C has
a counterpart analyst in the facility that prepares AAR slides and computerized pictures of
the battlefield. The O/C has a reliable and immediate radio communications link to his
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counterpart and they communicate frequently during the course of a battle. The O/C will
be able to call in his evaluations to his analyst who will enter the data into the database.
This method is recommended to ease the burden on the O/C who may not have the
opportunity to record an observation due to the tactical situation. It also does not distract
him from his primary mission of observing and controlling units.
Although the method calls for all observations to be time tagged, the O/C should
still fill out a final assessment, using the same evaluation card, at the end of the battle. The
reason for this is that there may be certain areas of performance that were not evaluated
during the course of a battle and there are certain objective O/C collected data that are
only available at the end of a battle such as the number of personnel that are assessed as
"died of wounds" and the final OR rate of a unit. The O/C directed end-of-mission time
should be the time placed in the database for final observations.
Additionally, manually filling out the cards will provide analysts with training
evaluation data in the event that there are hardware or software problems with the
database or if the CIS is down for maintenance. The manual filling out of the cards should
not, however, preclude the O/C from calling in his final assessments to his TAP analyst.
The TAP analyst should have ample time prior to the task force AAR, conducted six hours
after end-of-mission, to input the data so queries can be made to the database for the
purpose of reports generation.
In order for O/C subjective evaluations to be an integral part in the NTC's goals of
reversing trends and conducting quality AARs, the data must be captured and stored in a
usable form. Benson developed a relational database to store the objective data
transmitted over the RDMS. This database can also be used to store O/C subjective
evaluations. The next chapter provides a brief discussion of relational databases and




IV. SUBJECTIVE DATA ENCAPSULATION AND MOP DEVELOPMENT
A. SUBJECTIVE DATA ENCAPSULATION
The database being implemented at the NTC is a semantic object model first
presented by Kroenke in 1988. The basic component of the model is the semantic object,
a "named collection of attributes that sufficiently describes a distinct identity" [Ref. 13].













Figure 9. Semantic Object.
Semantic objects are representations of distinct identities. Attributes describe the
object and can have various cardinalities. Figure 9 represents an object called CAR. The
Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) is the object identifier. JMC1212AS3453 is an
example instance of the object. A simple attribute of CAR is price because it has a single
numerical value. Dealership is a group attribute containing dealership, zip code, and
phone number. Salesperson is an object attribute that establishes a relationship between
one semantic object and another.
Each attribute of an object has a maximum and minimum cardinality. Minimum
values are typically 1 or 0. If the minimum is 0, then no value is required. If it is 1 , then it
must have a value for the object to be valid. In the CAR example, a car may or may not
have any options, yet there must be a VIN. The maximum cardinality is the maximum
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number of instances of the object. Generally, it is either 1 or N (several). If it is 1, then
the object can have only one instance. If it is N, then the attribute can have a range of
values. In the CAR object example, numerous options are accommodated, yet there is
only one Salesperson. Every attribute has a range of possible values called a domain
which can be numeric, string, or enumerated [Ref. 1].
2. Subjective Data Objects
Relational databases require transformations of semantic objects to facilitate
platform implementation. Two-dimensional tables containing data, called relations, are
developed from semantic objects. There are seven types of semantic objects which can be
manipulated to form relations. Benson provides examples of several types of
transformations. In his proposed database for the NTC, Benson introduces two objects of
interest that are critical to subjective data encapsulation. Figure 10 shows the two objects
[Ref. 1].
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Figure 10. Proposed Database Objects.
Two additional objects are proposed in this research to serve as the vehicles for
representing subjective data in the database. Figure 1 1 shows the objects used to model
O/C subjective data requirements. The Co/Pit Report object will model data from the
Company and Platoon O/C cards and the BOS Report object will model data from the task
force level BOS cards.
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CO/PLT REPORT




ID TF ID 1.1
Report ID 1.1
Value 1.1
TIME 1.1 TIME 1.1
Figure 11. Subjective Data Semantic Objects.
The two objects, along with the Task Force and Unit objects, can be transformed
into relations which will record the data in tabular form. The transformation of these

































Figure 12. Object Transformations.
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Table 7 shows an example relation with sample data. " ID" represents a
surrogate key that is automatically entered by the database to make each row of the table
unique.
_ID UNTT_ID1 Report ID Value TTMEJDI
1 1 40 2 1203
2 1 54 2 1203
3 2 74 3 1206
4 1 2 2 1323
5 2 7 4 1345
6 2 15 3 1438
Table 7. CO/PLT Report Relation.
3. Graphical User Interface
In order for the proposed system to work, there must be human interaction with
the database to input subjective O/C observations. Databases are complex mechanisms
and relatively few people possess the knowledge necessary to manipulate them. This
research proposes using a graphical user interface (GUI) that will allow TAF analysts to
input subjective O/C data with minimal effort. This GUI should be embedded in a
software application that can interact with the database.
Three frames of a sample GUI are displayed in Figures 13, 14, and 15,
respectively. This sample GUI was written in Borland Delphi 2.0 and is organized in the
same manner as the proposed evaluation system and the AARs. This familiar construction
by unit and battlefield operating system should facilitate the employment of this system by
the TAF analysts.
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MAIN CONTROL PANEL HlsIES
Fife Exit
NTC DATABASE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
OUTPUT
Figure 13. Main Control Panel (GUI).
Figure 13 shows the first frame of the GUI which simply allows the TAF analyst to
input or query data necessary to generate an AAR report. In this example, the input
button was selected. Figure 14 shows the next screen in the data input sequence. This
screen allows the analyst to select the BOS, unit echelon, and the specific unit for whom
the data will be inputted. In this example, the Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability




















Figure 14. Attribute Selection (GUI).
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Figure 15 shows the final input screen. Because the M/CM/S BOS was selected in
conjunction with the selection of a company-sized unit, the input screen displays the tasks
listed in the M/CM/S section of the Company O/C card. Figure 15 indicates that
evaluations and observation times for three executed tasks are being placed in the database
for A/2-18 AR.
L, DATA INPUT Frrl
RATING TIME
F Breach Obstacle* |2 061800 •
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ReturnUNIT/TF A/2-1 8 AR
Figure 15. Data Input (GUI).
B. MOP DEVELOPMENT
O/C feedback provided during AARs and in unit THPs is critical to improving unit
performance at the NTC. The AARs focus on what happened, why it happened and how
the unit can improve. The O/Cs begin the AAR process with a specific agenda detailing
the aspects of the battle they want to discuss. One goal of the O/C is to get the
BLUEFOR to initiate the relevant discussion. Often times, the unit is reluctant to offer
substantial comments or embarks down a path of discussion that the O/C believes is not
productive.
This research proposes using performance indicator reports as a tool for the O/C
to use to get BLUEFOR units to initiate relevant discussion. The reports are generated by-
making queries to the database and include both subjective O/C data as well as objective
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data provided by the RDMS. The reports are broken down by BOS which makes
incorporation of the reports into the AAR a simple task.
The reports themselves are measures of performance within a specified BOS.
They will typically yield a numeric value and certain values are preferred over others. For
example, a unit desires a low "died of wounds" rate in the BOS CSS while at the same
time it desires a high operational readiness (OR) rate. If a unit has a high "died of
wounds" rate, that is an indication that there is a problem with the unit's casualty
evacuation or medical treatment systems. Conversely, a high OR rate indicates a strong
performance in maintenance.
Unlike the training evaluation system where a rating of 5 always indicates excellent
performance and a rating of 1 always indicates poor performance, regardless of the task,
the MOPs vary. For some MOPs, high values are preferred, and for others, low values are
desired. Although this may seem inconsistent, the MOP design is intentional in order to
discuss training in the vernacular of the combat units that rotate through the NTC. Army
units discuss casualties in terms of the percentage of soldiers who die as a result of their
wounds and not the percentage of soldiers who do not die from their wounds. This
inconsistency is tolerable because BLUEFOR units and O/Cs will have no difficulty
interpreting the results.
There is no requirement from the NTC to combine the individual measures of
performance of a specific BOS into an overall measure of effectiveness (MOE) for that
BOS. If desired in the future, analysts can simply take the converse ofMOPs where low
values are preferred to obtain consistent MOPs where high values are always best.
Analysts can then apply various weighting techniques or other methods to develop an
overall MOE for any BOS. However, it is not practical, or desired, to combine measures
of performance of different BOS s in an attempt to develop one, single measure of
effectiveness for a unit's performance. Researchers have attempted in the past to use the
loss-exchange ratio (LER) as an overall measure of effectiveness. This often presents
skewed data because the LERs of battles conducted at the NTC are highly dependent
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upon when the O/Cs stop a particular battle. If a battle was stopped because the forward
companies in a defense were attrited and the reserve company was too far back to get into
the fight, a higher LER will be obtained than if all companies had been engaged. Artillery
accuracy also affects the LER. Simulated artillery at the NTC lands precisely on the
coordinates given in the call for fire. This greatly favors the OPFOR whose knowledge of
the terrain results in more accurate calls for fire. Another problem arises because the
engagements are conducted with MILES. The OPFOR trains about 100 days a year with
MILES whereas BLUEFOR units only train with MILES about 25 days per year [Ref.
14]. The goal of the MOPs is to display performance indicators to BLUEFOR units and
not to provide one overall measure of how well the unit performed during its rotation. An
overall MOE might lead people to rank and compare units and this is not the purpose of
the NTC.
As previously stated, the primary purpose of the indicator reports is to initiate
discussion during AARs. These reports can be maintained across the various battles to
show improvements in performance or a degradation in unit performance. The key to
making the reports a useful tool is determining the time periods from which useful data
can be obtained. Periods of interest often will vary depending on the BOS from which an
O/C wants a report. For the BOS Maneuver, critical periods may be direct fire
engagements, obstacle breaches, and actions on the objective during a deliberate attack.
For the BOS Intelligence, the critical period may be the 24 hours of intelligence gathering
and analysis prior to being attacked by the OPFOR. The NTC typically allows rotating
units to fight until they are almost completely destroyed. The data produced when 8
BLUEFOR vehicles are defending against 80 remaining OPFOR vehicles is essentially
meaningless. O/Cs and TAP analysts need to exercise sound judgment in making the
proper queries to the database to get meaningful results.
The next two sections of this chapter provide examples of indicator reports for the
Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS) Intelligence and Maneuver which can be used to
generate AAR discussion and track unit performance. The intent of these reports is not to
compare one unit against another. It is critical to use the reports to generate discussion
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and monitor the performance of individual units or staff sections. Indicator reports for the
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Figure 1 6 displays data generated by making queries to the database. The
information displayed in the figure comes from the Intelligence BOS card. The purpose of
this report is to generate discussion on the collection of intelligence. The number of spot
reports and percent of Named Areas of Interest (NAIs) and Targeted Areas of Interest
(TAIs) covered are measures where high values are preferred to low ones. The number of
Requests for Information (RFIs) is a relative number, but can still be beneficial during
AAR discussion. If a unit had little information on enemy locations or intentions and only
submitted two RFIs, then it did not make full use of all tools available to acquire the
necessary information.
The O/Cs must use the charts to focus discussion on issues beyond the numbers.
In the above example, the unit only covered 5 out of 8 NAIs and TAIs with intelligence
assets. The critical discussion must examine the reasons why this occurred. Did the unit
fail to plan assets properly, did allocated assets get destroyed enroute to observation post
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(OP) locations, or were assets unavailable? Additional discussion can focus on redundant
coverage of critical NAIs/TAIs as well as the unit's selection of NAIs/TAIs. These are
just a few of areas that can be addressed from such a simple numeric measure of
performance.
The MOP, number of spot reports, generates discussion in other areas. The O/Cs
can ask leading questions prompting units to talk about the quality of spot reports as well
as the principal sources of the spot reports. Did all the spot reports come from
intelligence assets or did the platoons and companies generate some as well? Discussion
can also lead into the S-2 (Intelligence) section's methods for recording, analyzing, and
distributing to subordinates the information obtained from the spot reports.
The MOPs shown in Figure 16 can be used in conjunction with tools already in use
at the NTC. When discussing intelligence, the O/Cs display computerized maps of the
battlefield showing actual enemy locations and schematics of their intended courses of
action versus the S-2's estimate of enemy positions and intentions. The S-2's NAI/TAI
locations can be analyzed to determine if they assisted the S-2 in helping the commander
"see the enemy" and can lead to discussion on how to improve for the next battle.
2. Maneuver
Figures 16 and 17 display data transmitted over the RDMS and Figure 18 displays
data contained on the Company O/C evaluation card. They display three MOPs for the
BOS Maneuver. Units desire a high force ratio during operations and a low rounds per
kill. The number of dismounts who dismount the BFVs and actually get into the battle is a
relative number and depends greatly upon the tactical situation in the individual
companies. Benson addresses three additional maneuver MOPs: engagements by target
type, engagement ranges by weapon system, and a BLUEFOR/OPFOR engagement
comparison [Ref. 1].
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Figure 17. Force Ratio.
ROUNDS PER KILL





START TIME: 060800 MAR
END TIME : 060920 MAR
COMMENTS: LFX, Night
ROUNDS PER KILL
A Tank B Mech C Mech
Unit
DTank
Figure 18. Rounds Per Kill.
These simple MOPs can again lead to valuable discussion. The force ratio MOP
can be addressed by time periods centered around critical events. O/Cs can use sharp
declines in the force ratio caused by chance engagements or indirect fires to initiate
discussion about actions on contact or reactions to indirect fire. The rounds per kill
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statistic is not shown to compare companies, but to generate discussion on gunnery
techniques. In Figure 18, A Tank averaged 3.1 rounds per kill while D Tank averaged 7.6
rounds per kill. The key is for the O/C conducting the AAR to use these figures to
ascertain the underlying causes of the different averages. Is it a function of boresighting
techniques and ranges, individual crew gunnery skills, or is the underlying cause fire
distribution and control? Soliciting healthy discussion from the company commanders will
benefit the entire task force. Additionally, these MOPs can be tracked over various battles
to show units how their gunnery performance varies over time, defensive versus offensive
operations, and day versus night operations.
DISMOUNT UTILIZATION
USE OF DISMOUNTS BY COMPANY ROTATION: 96-06
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Totals 70 21 17 5
Figure 19. Dismount Utilization
Figure 19 shows the number of dismounts out of those available who dismount the
BFVs by company and their effects on enemy strength. A significant, yet often forgotten,
element of combat power within a task force are the dismounted infantrymen carried in the
back of the M2 BFVs. Typical mechanized units focus so much on gunnery and
mechanized training that the use of dismounts is often overlooked, a tendency often
exhibited at the NTC. The O/Cs can prompt company commanders to discuss the tactical
considerations that led them to dismount their infantrymen or have them remain mounted.
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Further prompting can lead to discussion on dismounted infantry planning considerations,
rehearsals, and their effectiveness against enemy dismounted troops and combat vehicles.
The O/Cs are critical to making the MOPs useful tools. If they can show numeric
figures and ask the right leading questions, the result will be open professional dialogue
that will promote learning. An added benefit of these MOPs and a professional AAR is
the education of BLUEFOR units in assessing their training at home station. The NTC
O/Cs give the best AARs in the Army and they can use them as vehicles to teach units
how to AAR themselves.
3. Additional Battle Analysis
The indicator reports are designed to be standard reports that can be produced as
applicable for a particular AAR. The O/Cs can use additional information from the
database to highlight the factors that influenced a certain measure of performance. This
information can be used to support or reject the BLUEFOR' s analysis of a training
deficiency. For example, when preparing for an AAR, an O/C observes the Attrition to
Red A/C report shown in Figure 20.
ATTRITION BY RED A/C @
KILLS BY TYPE A/C ROTATION: 96-06
MISSION: DATK
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Figure 20. Attrition by OPFOR Aircraft.
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This chart shows that OPFOR aircraft killed an extensive number of BLUEFOR
systems and experienced only one HIND helicopter lost to a M2 BFV. The conclusion to
be drawn from this chart is that the BLUEFOR did a poor job in defending against enemy
air attack. To gain additional information, the O/C has his TAF analyst query the database
to obtain relevant information from the Air Defense, Platoon, and Company O/C cards.
The results of the query are displayed in Figure 21.
Air Defense
Employ Air Defense guns and missiles







Air guard SOP and execution 3.56
Companv
Employment of organic weapons against enemy air 4.23
Figure 21. Query.
During the course of the AAR, the chart in Figure 20 is shown to solicit comments
on the BOS Air Defense. The battalion air defense officer proposes that the small number
of aircraft shot down can be attributed to the small volumes of fire provided by the
maneuver companies because they were involved in direct fire engagements against enemy
ground forces. All four company commanders contest that line of reasoning, claiming that
their men were engaging aircraft.
O/Cs can then show the chart in Figure 21. This chart refutes the air defense
officer's assessment of the poor performance and supports the company commanders'
claims that their systems were shooting. The major causes behind the lack of air defense
protection appear to be poor early warning and a poor analysis of enemy air avenues of
approach. The O/Cs must get the unit to offer discussion in these areas so that they
understand their shortcomings. Given the data in Figure 2 1 , the O/Cs may also want to




Not all relevant training issues get discussed during the conduct of an AAR. The
two-hour time limit on the AAR limits the discussion to only the most critical training
issues. Many problem areas remain unresolved when units return to home station. The 14
days of training against the OPFOR occur at a pace that keeps the BLUEFOR and the
O/Cs extremely busy. The BLUEFOR is continually planning or preparing to fight the
next battle while the O/Cs are observing training or preparing and conducting AARs.
There is little time for the BLUEFOR to reflect on what has occurred. The only way
smaller training issues are surfaced is by the O/Cs discussing them with the unit in an
informal forum outside of the AAR or if they include them in the THP.
However, current THPs are only as good as the O/C's memory and the amount of
effort he puts into them. Historically, they are not used very extensively at home station.
Current efforts by NPS students Olenginski and Seise attempt to remedy this shortcoming.
They are developing a CD-ROM based THP that will incorporate the proposed database
of both RDMS and subjective O/C data. The THP will allow analysis of every battle a
unit fights by Battlefield Operating System (BOS) and will contain selected audio and
video data. The purpose of having the data embedded in the CD-ROM is to allow the
BLUEFOR units the opportunity to conduct their own detailed analysis at home station
without any time constraints.
Current post-rotation analysis is conducted at the Center for Army Lessons
Learned (CALL) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. CALL analysts receive video tapes of all
AARs, operational graphics, analog tapes of the current database, and an executive
summary version of the THP. They are responsible for the storage of these materials for
archival purposes.
Extracting data from the current database is very complicated and often yields
marginal results. Additionally, O/C observations are included only in the form of narrative
comments, thus analysts are forced to assign some form of measurement scale to the
descriptive words of the O/C without any supporting data. The proposed database and
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CD-ROM THP will support simple data retrieval, include O/C subjective evaluations, and
support digital audio and video data.
Post-rotation analysis is beneficial for two reasons: 1) it identifies the training
deficiencies of the rotating unit and 2) it assists in the development of current training
trends. These two forms of analysis are distinctly different. One type attempts to identify
the training shortcomings of one unit during one rotation so that the unit can develop a
training plan to correct them, while the other attempts to identify systematic shortcomings
for all units across all rotations.
1. Army Trends
The NTC maintains a list of the top ten training trends that it desires to reverse.
These trends are currently based on O/C observations without any form of O/C subjective
data to support them. The areas of performance in need of improvement are shown in
Figure 22.
NTC TRENDS
Actions on Contact/Maneuver/Direct Fire Lethality
Fire Support and CAS Employment
Intelligence Operations
- IPB (PIR, HPTs, DPs)
- R&S Planning/Execution
- Collect, Analyze, Disseminate, Decide
Combat/Quick Decision Making, Prep for Combat
and Battle Command
TF Defense (Developing Engagement Areas)
AH-64 Offensive/Armed Recce Operations
Tactical Logistics
MILES/TOW Lethality
Use of Bradley Dismounted Infantry
Engineer Effort in Support of Commander's Intent
Figure 22. NTC Trends.
The trends listed in Figure 22 are loosely defined and cover broad areas of
performance. The NTC has assigned responsible O/C teams to develop methodologies to
reverse these trends. A shortage of reliable data has hampered attempts by the NTC to
monitor and reverse noted trends. Critical to reversing trends is identification of the root
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causes behind substandard performance. The evaluation cards proposed in this research
can serve as a tool to assist O/Cs in this task. Additionally, O/Cs can use the task of
interest blocks on the cards to further help them in root cause analysis.
One of the trends listed in Figure 22 is intelligence operations. O/Cs can use the
Intelligence BOS card to determine the underlying causes of the poor performance in
intelligence operations. If the card does not provide the necessary information to
accomplish this, the senior O/C responsible for reversing this trend should add as many
tasks of interest as he feels necessary to collect the needed data. This technique is
analogous to the focused rotation (FR) concept that has been used by the RAND
Corporation and other analytic agencies when conducting studies at the NTC. RAND has
discovered that it takes at least 12 rotations worth of data to allow for meaningful analysis
[Ref. 14].
Tracking of Commander's Priority Requirements (PIR)
Triggers to shift recon focus based on enemy situation
Tracking of R&S assets
Figure 23. Tasks of Interest.
In order to determine the root causes of poor performance in intelligence
operations, the O/C responsible for evaluating intelligence adds the tasks of interest
shown in Figure 23 to the Intelligence BOS card. These data, along with data collection
items currently on the Intelligence BOS card, could be maintained over several rotations
to see what trends, if any, exist. The subjective evaluations of the three tasks of interest
along with the "collect information" and "process information" sections of the
Intelligence BOS card are in Table 8.
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flotation A 8 c D E F Q H J J K L Mean s
Collect Informatiion
3 2 3 4 3 1 3 5 3 3 4 3 3.08 0.99Information collected as result of R&S plan
Continuous collection from all sources 2 1 2 3 1 2 3 3 2 1 2 3 2.08 0.79
Process Information
2 1 1 2 2 3 3 1 2 2 1 1 1.75 0.75Evaluate threat information
Evaluate physical environment 4 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 3.17 0.58
Integrate intelligence information 1 3 4 2 5 1 5 2 1 1 3 2.33 1.67
Develop enemy intentions 1 1 2 1 1 3 1 2 1 1 3 4 1.75 1.05
Develop targeting information 3 2 5 4 3 2 1 5 3 4 2 4 3.17 1.26
Prepare intelligence reports 4 3 4 4 4 3 2 1 2 2 3 3 2.91 0.99
Update situational template N/O 2 1 N/O N/O 2 2 1 0.89 0.92
Provide battlefield reports 5 1 2 3 1 3 2 4 1 3 3 4 2.67 1.3
Tasks of Interest
Tracking commander's PIR 2 1 5 N/O 2 N/O 4 2 1 4 2.1 1.72
Triggers to shift recon focus 1 2 2 2 2 1 0.83 0.93
Tracking R&S assets 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 5 3.16 0.72
Table 8. Intelligence Data.
Table 8 displays the O/C subjective data collected from twelve hypothetical live-
fire deliberate attack missions. The last two columns show the sample mean (x) and
sample standard deviation (s) for each area of performance. These two simple statistics
make identifying performance trends an easy task.
The mean provides the arithmetic average of the subjective O/C ratings per task
across the twelve rotations. This gives the O/C a general idea how well units are
performing each task over numerous rotations. Values over 2.5 indicate that units are
performing the task in an adequate manner; values below 2.5 indicate less than adequate
performance. However, the more beneficial of the two statistics is the sample standard
deviation. The standard deviation measures dispersion about the mean. A large standard
deviation indicates that the units vary widely in their performance of the task.
Small standard deviations are key to identifying trends in unit performance. From
Table 8, two evaluated tasks show identical means. Both tasks, "evaluate physical
environment" and "develop targeting information", had a mean of 3.17 over the twelve
rotations. The large difference in the standard deviations of these two tasks provide two
different interpretations of the data. The standard deviation for the task "develop
targeting information" is more than twice that of the task "evaluate physical environment",
meaning that performance on the former task varied widely between the units. The task
"evaluate physical environment" had a standard deviation of 0.58 which indicates that
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every unit performed at a level near the mean. In this case, the mean of 3.17 indicates a
trend of adequate performance in that task.
Critical to O/Cs and analysts are the tasks that have a low mean and a low standard
deviation. From Table 8, the task "update situational template" shows a mean of 0.89 and
a standard deviation of 0.92. These statistics indicate a trend of poor performance with
only a small amount of variation between units. If these were actual historical data, these
data would lead one to conclude that the task "update situational template" is a
contributing factor to the stated NTC trend of poor performance in the area of intelligence
operations.
2. Trend Reversal
It is important for the O/Cs and analysts to note, however, that this type of analysis
only identifies the contributing factors to poor performance. In no way does it provide
methods to reverse trends. Reversing a trend is a distinct and separate issue. The
performance of a unit at NTC is a function of many variables. Personnel turnover, the
amount of training time available at home station, experience level of leadership, unit
motivation, and the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) employed by that unit are
just a few of the variables that can affect a unit's performance. All of these variables have
the potential to be contributing factors to poor performance. The NTC can only impact a
few of these variables; it should not be looked upon as a panacea to correct all training
shortcomings within a unit.
The NTC has no control over personnel turbulence, the training time allotted to a
unit at home station, or its motivation and esprit de corps. The greatest benefits that
BLUEFOR units derive from their NTC rotations are a thorough training assessment and a
professional discussion of TTPs. The vast majority of units have a solid understanding of
Army doctrine taught in the service schools and written in numerous manuals. These
sources discuss combat operations in terms of basic principles and tenets such as mass,
surprise, agility, and versatility [Ref. 15], but they often refrain from providing the
implementing techniques necessary to insure these principles are met.
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Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are what units employ to satisfy the
principles of successful combat operations. Although recent field manuals have
documented some TTPs in rudimentary fashion, TTPs are in a constant state of change
because of equipment and force structure changes. The O/Cs at the NTC get to observe
the TTPs employed by all BLUEFOR units and thus are able to recommend TTPs that
have been proven effective over time. Documenting these TTPs with the Center for Army
Lessons Learned (CALL) and the numerous professional periodicals in existence will help
disseminate useful TTPs Army-wide. These recommended TTPs could also be included in
the CD-ROM THP that will be given to all units upon completion of their rotation.
Additionally, the NTC should maintain a composite historical database to assist in
trend analysis. This database should be tailored so that it only contains relevant data in
order to minimize storage requirements. Only the RDMS data from the actual battles and
subjective O/C evaluations should be stored. This will allow O/Cs and analysts to be able
to analyze trends over long periods of time to determine whether or not there have been
any training improvements. There are a number of statistical techniques, the method of
moving averages for example, that can be employed to track long term historical trends.
3. BLUEFOR Analysis
Upon completion of a rotation at the NTC, O/Cs conduct final AARs on each unit.
BLUEFOR units typically receive their written THP at this time. In this final AAR, O/Cs
discuss the overall strengths and areas in need of improvement for each unit. Much of the
discussion focuses on developing a training plan that the unit can implement at home
station to correct noted training deficiencies. However, the full implications and benefits
of a unit's rotation at the NTC are not yet fully known at this point. Units are mentally
and physically exhausted after 14 days in the desert and are also focused on the enormous
tasks of turning in all their equipment to NTC motor pools and redeploying to home
station. The overall lessons learned from the rotation will not be realized until well after
the rotation when the unit can reflect upon its performance.
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Imbedding the data from a rotation in the CD-ROM THP will provide new
opportunities for BLUEFOR units to conduct detailed analysis of their rotation at home
station. A battalion commander will now have access to numerical evaluations of
performance instead of narrative comments stating that the unit should "sustain" its
performance on task A and that performance on task B "needs improvement." Battalion
commanders know their units much better than the O/Cs at NTC. They know which of
their units have high personnel turbulence, inexperienced leaders, or have had a lack of
quality field training opportunities. This knowledge will allow them to draw more
meaningful conclusions from the data.
The purpose for conducting detailed home station analysis is to finalize the
development of a training plan to address noted training deficiencies. The CD-ROM THP
currently under development will incorporate pick lists, making it easy for leaders at home
station to examine the data in a variety of ways. Potential analyses include, but are not
limited to, a cross-unit analysis, an echelon analysis, or a time analysis of a particular BOS
or unit. The unit knowledge of the leader conducting the analysis will allow him to focus
on only the most relevant O/C observations.
Platoon A B C D E F G H i J K L Mean S
Prep for Combat
Boresight 3 3 2 2 3 3 4 1 3 4 3 2 2.75 0.87
PCI 2 4 3 3 5 1 4 1 5 3 4 2.92 1.62
Class lll/V upload 4 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 2 3.42 0.69
Rehearsals 3 2 3 5 4 1 3 5 1 3 2 3 2.92 1.31
Safety/risk 4 3 2 3 1 3 2 1.5 1.51
Warning Order 3 1 2 3 2 N/0 3 1 1 1.45 1.21
Operations Order 2 2 1 2 3 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1.67 0.65
Mean 2 2.57 2.42 3 2.85 2.28 2 2.83 2.14 2.57 1.71 2.28
Standard Dev. 1.53 1.39 1.13 1.15 1.57 1.25 1.52 1.72 1.06 1.9 1.38 0.95
Table 9. Cross-unit Analysis (Prep for Combat).
Table 9 displays the subjective O/C evaluations of a battalion's 12 platoons on
preparation for combat tasks. This table shows data from one battle. A composite table
could show the averages for each platoon across all battles conducted during the rotation.
What is immediately apparent from the table are the low means for the last three tasks in
the table. These are leader tasks and the evaluations indicate that performance was
substandard. The battalion commander's knowledge about the amount of experience his
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platoon leaders have preparing orders and the time constraints they were placed under at
NTC will enable him to make an assessment beyond the numbers.
Table 10 shows the rounds per kill statistics for each platoon and company as well
as the overall task force statistics for the two daytime live-fire missions. These data,
separated by echelon, show the effectiveness of gunners during defensive versus offensive
operations. This same type of side-by-side comparison could be done for day versus night
operations. To gain additional information about gunnery skills, the battalion commander
could examine engagement range data, fire control and distribution observations, and
boresight data. Leaders can use these data to determine if a high rounds per kill is a
gunnery problem alone, or if the battalion also needs to improve in fire control and
distribution or boresighting.
ROUNDS PER K LL
Defense Offense
M1 M2 M1 M2







































TF Totals 2.4 17.9 4.1 24.2
Table 10. Echelon Analysis (Rounds per kill).
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BOS- Intelligence FOF Live Fire FOF
MTC DEF DATK DATK DEF MTC DATK
Process Information
1 2 2 2 2 3 3Evaluate threat information
Evaluate physical environment 2 2 4 4 2 3 5
Integrate intelligence information 1 1 2 2 2 3 2
Develop enemy intentions 1 3 2 3 5 1 3
Develop targeting information 1 1 2 2 2 2
Prepare intelligence reports 3 2 3 3 4 3 3
Update situational template 1 2 2 1 2 1 1
Provide battlefield reports 2 2 2 2 3 3 3
Table 11. Time Analysis (Process Information).
Table 1 1 displays subjective O/C evaluations for the "process information" section
of the Intelligence BOS card across all battles of a battalion's rotation. The battalion
commander or S-2 could use this information to identify the specific areas or particular
types of battles where performance was less than adequate. It is not always necessary to
calculate means and standard deviations to draw conclusions from the data. A cursory
inspection of Table 1 1 shows that performance of the tasks "update situational template"
and "develop targeting information" were poor throughout the rotation, while
performance on the task "prepare intelligence reports" was continually solid. Additionally,
the S-2 section did a good job evaluating the physical environment for deliberate attacks,
but did a poor job developing enemy intentions for movements to contact.
The pick lists on the CD-ROM THP will support a variety of analyses and not all
analysis should be driven by numbers and statistics. The CD-ROM THP will contain
numerous computerized pictures of the critical phases in each instrumented battle. These
pictures are beneficial because they display the actual locations and strengths of both
BLUEFOR and OPFOR units. A battalion commander could examine various pictures of
a breaching operation by time period to analyze the effectiveness of fires from the support
force, the effectiveness of indirect fires, and the number of BLUEFOR vehicles destroyed
during the actual breach. Other pictures can be used to examine how particular battlefield
operating systems (BOS) were, integrated in the battle. The S-2's estimate of enemy
locations in the vicinity of the breach can be superimposed on actual enemy locations.
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This can provide insight into the sufficiency of NAI/TAI locations and the task force
reconnaissance effort.
Thorough home station analysis is critical to developing a sound training plan.
Leaders at home station have a better feel for what training opportunities and resources
actually exist. A detailed analysis with applied leader knowledge will allow leaders to
develop training priorities and determine the level of training that needs to be executed in
order to correct training deficiencies. In some situations, the answer will be professional
development classes. In others, the answer might be combat simulations, staff exercises,
or field exercises. The value of this analysis is the commander's ability to determine the
appropriate training tool to correct the deficiency in the least amount of time using the
fewest resources. The introduction of the CD-ROM THP will significantly increase the
amount, speed, and quality of home station analysis.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
This research proposed several methodologies for the NTC. The first
methodology specified the tasks that should be subjectively evaluated by O/Cs. These
tasks, organized by BOS, represent a refined list that is based upon tasks currently
evaluated at the NTC and tasks listed in U. S. Army training manuals.
A second methodology developed a subjective training measurement scale that is a
minor modification of standard graphic rating scales. Behaviorally anchored words and
added standards for each evaluation assist in making this a scale that exhibits equal interval
properties. In addition to the scale are other evaluation categories that were designed to
remove ambiguity and account for all possible evaluation scenarios. With assistance from
TAP analysts, it is now possible to make numerous judgments on tasks that are executed
repeatedly during the course of a battle.
This research also proposed the addition of two semantic objects to the database
developed by Benson to facilitate the implementation of subjective data into the database
[Ref. 1]. An example graphical user interface (GUI) was included to demonstrate the
simplistic system that TAP analysts will need to input subjective data into the database. A
similar GUI will allow TAP analysts to query the database to produce specialized reports
for AARs.
A fourth methodology developed quantifiable measures of performance (MOPs)
for each BOS to be used as indicators of performance. The implementation of these
MOPs is in the form of reports that are designed to generate AAR discussion. Also
included in this research was a discussion on how to query the database for additional
information in order to conduct a rudimentary root cause analysis of a training deficiency
indicated by a MOP.
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Finally, this research proposed a methodology for conducting post rotation
analysis using basic statistics. The focus of this analysis was twofold. First, O/Cs and
analysts could conduct analysis to identify training deficiencies across all units over all
rotations. The purpose of this analysis was to identify the root causes of negative trends.
Methods were introduced to reverse trends through the quantifiable identification of the
root causes of the trend, a recommendation to include successful TTPs in the CD-ROM
based THP
,
and tracking techniques to monitor performance on tasks listed as negative
trends.
A discussion of unit post rotational analysis provided a methodology for units at
home station to query data from the CD-ROM THP to conduct further analysis. Methods
included the use of unit based knowledge, statistics, and the other graphical measures
provided in the THP. The purpose of this analysis differs from the O/Cs' analysis in that it
focuses on only one unit and its purpose is to assist in training plan development.
The greatest strength of all these methodologies is that they are simple. They
involve the examination of training by BOS and by unit echelon, techniques already in use
at the NTC. Additionally, when mathematics are introduced, only simple, commonly
understood statistics are recommended for root cause analysis and trend identification.
Graphical user interfaces are recommended to enable every analyst to have the ability to
input data into the database as well as query the database for information to produce
specific reports.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Future research should focus on three distinct areas. The methodologies presented
in this research are all oriented on the maneuver task force. Future studies should focus
on the combat units not examined (attack aviation and field artillery units) as well as
combat support and combat service support units. Not only should consideration for
these units alone be given, but how they interact together within a maneuver brigade.
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NTC currently has plans to replace microwave transmissions with a fiber optic
communications network. The leadership at NTC also desires to have fully automated
platoon and company AARs in the future. With network access available inside the
maneuver training areas, consideration should be given to allowing the O/Cs to input their
own data with the assistance of small, lightweight computers. This network will also
allow the O/C to retrieve data from the database for the conduct of automated AARs.
Future research could focus on developing a methodology of implementing such a data
intensive event just two hours after the conclusion of a battle.
Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed measurement system and MOPs should
be examined. The MOPs should be evaluated to examine if they are providing the
necessary information to generate quality AAR discussion. The measurement system
should be inspected to check if it meets normally accepted standards in the areas of
reliability, accuracy, and validity.
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APPENDIX A. BOS EVALUATION CARDS
1. Intelligence
Mission DATK MTC DEF LF FOF
TF TD
Conduct Intelligence Planning




91 Input to DST
92 Terrain and Weather Analysis
Observation
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
Collect Information
93 Spot report received as a result of R&S plan
94 Continuous information collection and
acquisition from all sources
95 # NIA.TIA/Covered by scouts or IEW
96 RFI submission
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
/
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
Process Information
97 Evaluate threat information
98 Evaluate physical environment
99 Integrate intelligence information
100 Develop enemy intentions
101 Develop targeting information
102 Prepare intelligence reports
103 Update situational template
104 Provide battlefield area reports
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
Disseminate Intelliqence
105 Sending processed intelligence
to maneuver teams
106 Sending of raw intelligence directly from R&S
elements to cdr should it be time sensitive
107 Dissemination of battlefield reports
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
108 Task of Interest 1
109 Task of Interest 2
110 Task of Interest3
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O





Mission DATK MTC DEF LF FOF
TF TD
Conduct Tactical Movement Observation
113 Movement, mounted and dismounted; on road 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
and cross country
114 Closure of movement- tactical assembly area 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
tactical positions
115 Navigation 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 1 6 Force Protection 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
117 Air movement 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
Engaqe Enemy with Direct Fire and Maneuver
118 Preparation of engagement areas 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
119 Rehearsals of battle plans 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
120 Fire control and distribution 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
121 Integration of direct fire with maneuver 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
122 Control of terrain 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
123 Consolidation and Reorganization 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
124 Task of Interest 1 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
125 Task of Interest 2 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O





Mission DATK MTC DEF LF FOF
TF TD
Employ Mortars Observation
129 Prepare to fire checks 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
130 Development of order to fire 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
131 Tactical movement 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
132 FDC operations 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
133 Target engagements 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
134 Fire Mission
#Rounds/lneffective, Suppressive, or Effective
Employ Field Artillery
/
135 Fire Support-Maneuver rehearsals 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
136 FSE operations 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
137 Preparation 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 38 Execution 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
139 FSO and FIST operations in coordination 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
with their maneuver commander
140 Indirect fires in support of maneuver cdr's ntent 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
141 Indirect fire planning as battlefield METT-T change 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
142 Fire Mission
#Rounds/lneffective, Suppressive, or Effective
Employ Close Air Support
/
143 Air-ground attack requests 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
144 Airspace coordination and management 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
Coordinate. Synchronize, and Inteqrate FS
145 Coordination of all fire support means in support 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
of maneuver cdr's concept and intent
146 Preparation and execution tasks undertaken to 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
integrate the fire support plan detailed in OPORD
147 Task of Interest 1 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
148 Task of Interest 2 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O





Mission DATK MTC DEF LF FOF
TF TD
Take Active Air Defense Measures
152 Employ Air Defense Artillery guns and missiles
153 Airspace management
154 Early warning
155 # Enemy a/c flown / # destroyed
Take Passive Air Defense Measures
156 Air avenues of approach identified and disseminated
157 Dispersion
158 Cover and concealment
159 Deception
160 Task of Interest 1
161 Task of Interest 2
162 Task of Interest3
163 Freeform 1
Observation
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
/
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O




Mission DATK MTC DEF LF FOF
TF TD
Overcome Obstacles
165 Breach a defended obstacle
166 Cross gaps
Observation
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
Provide Countermobility
167 Emplacement of mines and complex obstacles
168 Digging tank ditches
169 Creation of road craters with explosives
170 Terrain enhancement
171 Employ scatterable mines
172 # Mines employed / # mines available
Enhance Physical Protection
173 Construction of fighting positions
174 Preparation of protective positions
175 Employment of protective equipment
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
/
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
Provide Operations Security
176 Analysis to determine key assets and
threats to them
177 Cover and concealment
178 Camouflage
179 Noise and light discipline
180 Counter reconnaissance
181 Physical Security measures
182 Signal security
183 Electronic security
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
Provide Decontamination
184 Decontamination of weapon systems and supplies
185 Hasty and Deliberate decon
186 Proper and timely NBC reports sent
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
187 Task of Interest 1
188 Task of Interest 2
189 Task of Interest 3
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O




6. Combat Service Support
Mission DATK MTC DEF LF FOF
TF TD
Conduct SuddIv Operations Observation
192 Requesting, receiving, storing, protecting, and 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
issuing supplies to specific elements
1 93 Providing munitions to weapon systems 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 94 Providing fuel and petroleum products 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 95 Reporting status 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
Provide Personnel Services
196 Replacement, casualty reporting 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 97 Awards and decorations 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 98 Postal operations 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
199 Promotions, reductions 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
200 Financial services 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
201 Unit Ministry team 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
202 Legal 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
203 Reporting of personnel status 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
204 Preservation of force through safety 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
Maintain Weapons and Equipment
205 Preventive maintenance 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
206 Recovery 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
207 Diagnosis, substitution, exchange, repair and 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
return of weapons and equipment
208 Reporting status 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
Provide Health Services
209 Preventive medicine 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
210 Field sanitation 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
Treat and Evacuate Battlefield Casualties
211 Tnage of battlefield casualties 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
212 Treatment and Movement of casualties to rear 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
213 Identification of levels of care and locations 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
214 Coordination of movement of aid stations to ensure 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
continuity of care
215 Rehearsals 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
216 Resupply 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
217 Evacuation 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
21 8 Ground ambulance and air-medevac 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
219 Handling and processing remains of soldiers who 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
have died of wounds
220 Reporting status 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
221 Task of Interest 1 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
222 Task of Interest 2 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O





Mission DATK MTC DEF LF FOF
TF TD
Conduct Supply Operations Observation
192 Requesting, receiving, storing, protecting, and 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
issuing supplies to specific elements
1 93 Providing munitions to weapon systems 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 94 Providing fuel and petroleum products 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 95 Reporting status 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
Provide Personnel Services
1 96 Replacement, casualty reporting 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 97 Awards and decorations 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
1 98 Postal operations 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
199 Promotions, reductions 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
200 Financial services 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
201 Unit Ministry team 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
202 Legal 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
203 Reporting of personnel status 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
204 Preservation of force through safety 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
Maintain Weapons and Equipment
205 Preventive maintenance 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
206 Recovery 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
207 Diagnosis, substitution, exchange, repair and 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
return of weapons and equipment
208 Reporting status 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
Provide Health Services
209 Preventive medicine 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
210 Field sanitation 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
Treat and Evacuate Battlefield Casualties
211 Triage of battlefield casualties 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
212 Treatment and Movement of casualties to rear 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
213 Identification of levels of care and locations 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
21 4 Coordination of movement of aid stations to ensure 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
continuity of care
215 Rehearsals 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
216 Resupply 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
217 Evacuation 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
218 Ground ambulance and air-medevac 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
219 Handling and processing remains of soldiers who 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
have died of wounds
220 Reporting status 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
22 1 Task of Interest 1 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O
222 Task of Interest 2 1 2 3 4 5 N/A N/O








FIRE SUPPORT STATISTICS ROTATION: 96-06
MISSION: DATK
PLATFORM TYPE: M198 START TIME: 060612 MAR
END TIME : 060740 MAR
FORCE: TF1/61AR COMMENTS: LFX, DAY
FIRE SUPPORT EFFECTIVENESS
Artil ery Mortars
Missions Rounds Missions Rounds














% Eff/Supp 67% 71% 50% 47%
Source of Data
The data for this report are obtained from the Fire Support O/C card and the RDMS.
Purpose
The purpose of this report is to show BLUEFOR units the effectiveness of their artillery





Scheme of fires in terms of task, purpose, method, and endstate
Integration of fires with ground maneuver plan
Indirect fire triggers








PLATFORM TYPE: A-10/F-16 START TIME: 060800 MAR










The data for this report are obtained from the RDMS.
Purpose
The purpose of this report is to show BLUEFOR units the effectiveness of Close Air
Support (CAS) employment.
Potential Discussion Items
Integration of CAS within the scheme of fires
Suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD)
Airspace Coordination Areas (ACA)
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2. Air Defense
ATTRITION BY RED A/C
**:~-Y,.-r-T7-
KILLS BY TYPE A/C ROTATION: 96-06
MISSION: DATK
PLATFORM TYPE: Harrier/HIND START TIME: 060630 MAR
END TIME : 060740 MAR
FORCE: TF1/61AR COMMENTS








Killed by Stinger- 5 Stinger- 2
M2-1
Source of Data
The data for this report are obtained from the Air Defense O/C card.
Purpose
The purpose of this report is to show the effectiveness of BLUEFOR combat and air





Detailed coverage plan integration within scheme of maneuver







PLATFORM TYPE: START TIME: 051540 MAR
END TIME : 062300 MAR





























Totals 38 26 68%
Source of Data
The data for this report are obtained from the Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability
(M/CM/S) card.
Purpose
The purpose of this report is to display the utilization of barrier and survivability assets.
Potential Discussion Items
Use of survivability assets
Hasty protective minefield emplacement and directed minefields emplacement
Engineer plan of platoon man-hours and refined timelines
Minefield reporting
Allocation of assets: countermobility versus survivability
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4. Combat Service Support
OPERATIONAL READINESS
M1/M2 OPERATIONAL READINESS ROTATION: 96-06
MISSION: MTC
PLATFORM TYPE: M1/M2 START TIME: 051540 MAR
END TIME : 061035 MAR
FORCE: TF1/61AR COMMENTS: FOF
OR RATE
M1 M2





















Totals 28 19 28 24
OR Rate 68% 86%
Source of Data
The data for this report are obtained from the Company O/C evaluation card.
Purpose
The purpose of this report is to show the effectiveness of BLUEFOR maintenance.
Potential Discussion Items
Maintenance system within task force
Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services (PMCS)
Parts ordering system
Tracking by Combat Trains and Field Trains Cps (Command Posts)
Employment ofUMCP (Unit Maintenance Collection Point)
Vehicle recovery policy
Assets and CP positioning plan
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CASUALTY STATISTICS
DOW VERSUS TOTAL CASUALTIES ROTATION: 96-06
MISSION: MTC
PLATFORM TYPE: PERSONNEL START TIME: 060600 MAR
END TIME : 061035 MAR
FORCE: TF1/61AR COMMENTS: FOF
DIED OF WOUNDS
Total
Casualties DOW % DOW
A Tank 14 11 79%
B Mech 26 6 23%
D Mech 33 9 27%
DTank 9 2 22%
Totals 82 28 34%
Source of Data
The data for this report are obtained from the Company O/C evaluation card.
Purpose
The purpose of this report is to show the effectiveness of BLUEFOR medical evacuation
an treatment systems.
Potential Discussion Items
Use of Buddy Aid and combat lifesavers
Casualty evacuation policy
Casualty evacuation plan and mass casualty evacuation
Positioning and coverage of forward and main aid stations





TF PLANNING PROCESS ROTATION: 96-06
MISSION: MTC
PLATFORM TYPE: START TIME: 051200 MAR
END TIME : 060600 MAR





















12(30 1 500 1800 2100 2400 0300 0600
Time
Source of Data
The data for this report are obtained from Platoon, Company, and Battle Command O/C
evaluation cards.
Purpose










Air Defense (ADA) - Operations that provide the force with protection from enemy air
attack, preventing the enemy from separating friendly forces while freeing the commander
to fully synchronize maneuver and firepower.
Battle Command (BC) - The art of battle decision making, leading, and motivating
soldiers and their organizations into action to accomplish missions. Includes visualizing
current state and future state, then formulating concepts of operations to get from one to
the other at least cost. Also includes assigning missions; prioritizing and allocating
resources; selecting the critical time and place to act; and knowing how and when to make
adjustments during the fight.
Combat Service Support (CSS) - The assistance provided to sustain combat forces,
primarily in the fields of administration and logistics. It includes administrative services,
chaplain services, civil affairs, food services, finance, legal services, maintenance, medical
services, supply, transportation, and other logistical services.
Fire Support (FS) - Fire support is the collective and coordinated employment of the
fires of armed aircraft, land and sea-based indirect fire systems, and electronic warfare
systems against ground targets to support land combat operations. Includes the
integration and synchronization of fires and effects to delay, disrupt, or destroy enemy
forces, combat functions, and facilities in pursuit of operational and tactical objectives.
Initiative - The ability to set or change the terms of battle; implies an offensive spirit
Intelligence (INT) - Intelligence operations are the organized efforts of a commander to
gather information on the environment of operations and the enemy. Assembling an
accurate picture of the battlefield requires centralized direction, simultaneous action at all
levels of command, and timely distribution of information throughout the command.
Mass - Mass the effects of overwhelming combat power at the decisive place and time.
Maneuver (MAN) - The movement of forces supported by fire to achieve a position of
advantage from which to destroy or threaten destruction of the enemy.
Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability (M/CM/S) - Mobility operations preserve the
freedom of maneuver for friendly forces. Mobility missions include breaching enemy
obstacles, increasing battlefield circulation, improving existing routes, and identifying
routes around contaminated areas. Countermobility efforts limit the maneuver of enemy
forces and enhance the effectiveness of fires. Countermobility missions include building
obstacles and using smoke to hinder enemy movement. Survivability operations protect
friendly forces from the effects of enemy weapons and from natural occurrences.
Deception, construction of fighting positions, operational security, dispersion, and nuclear,
biological chemical (NBC) defense measures are key survivability operations.
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Surprise - Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared.
Versatility - The ability of units to meet diverse challenges, shift focus, tailor forces, and
move from one role or mission to another rapidly and efficiently.
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